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Future of Irrigation and Drainage in Pakistan 
 
RASHID FARUQEE 
The future of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the future of its irrigation and drainage 
system, which currently faces major problems. Increasing water logging and salinity, over-
exploitation of fresh groundwater, low efficiency in delivering and use, inequitable 
distribution, unreliable delivery, and insufficient cost recovery are some of these problems. 
These problems, however, are only symptoms of a deeper problem—the treatment by the 
government of irrigation water as a public good. Such a treatment has caused inefficient 
pricing of water, misallocation of resources and widespread rent-seeking behaviour. 
The future strategy for irrigation and drainage will require a major change in the public 
sector’s approach. An efficient self-sustaining irrigation and drainage system can be achieved 
only by promoting market-determined incentives for improved management of the irrigation 
and drainage services and giving the private sector a greater stake in the system. The process 
could begin by developing commercially-oriented public utilities on a canal-command basis, 
developing suitable farmer organisations around distributaries/minors, formalising water rights, 
developing autonomous provincial water authorities, and developing provincial regulatory 
bodies for regulating public utilities, water rights, and groundwater resources. 
Public utilities at the canal command level—which are large enough to capture any scale 
economies in administration and yet small enough to be responsive to users—would play the 
leading role in the management of the system until user groups matured and were able to take 
over. Farmer organisations would have to be fostered to provide structure on the demand side. 
Such organisations would make a unique contribution to the welfare of farmers and to the 
development of Pakistan’s irrigation and drainage by providing a counterbalance to the 
monopoly of the public utilities, by facilitating water market development, and by reducing 
administrative and O&M costs. 
In the long term, farmer organisations would thus play a larger role. Because of the 
underdevelopment of farmer organisations so far, public utilities will have to play the leading 
role in the short run. The interim role of the public utilities should not impede eventual 
takeover by the farmer organisations and other local groups with valid interests in area water 
resource management. As the farmer organisations expand and become stronger, they are 
expected to become more involved in the work of the public utility through greater 
representation on its board. 
The total period required for transition to the new system depends on the acceptance of 
new institutional structure and the speed with which farmer organisations are developed. 
 
Irrigated land accounts for 76 percent of total agricultural land and more than 90 
percent of the value of agricultural production. Irrigated land area increased at the rate of 
1.5 percent a year during the period 1950–95. The increase in irrigated area was most 
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significant before 1980. Since the 1980s increases in irrigated area have come from 
groundwater tubewells and the area irrigated by canals has remained unchanged. 
Because the development of water resources is approaching its limits, there is little 
potential for further increase in irrigated areas. 
 
THE LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR INCREASING WATER SUPPLY 
AND THE NEED TO IMPROVE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY 
At present canal diversions to about 106 million acre feet annually, the level at 
which they have remained since 1980. Prospects for major increases in water supply to 
canals appear limited. River flows are fully utilised, except during the flood period in 
Kharif. The Water Apportionment Accord of 1991 allocated 117.35 million acre feet of 
water among the provinces, an increment of about 12 million acre feet. Incremental 
water above the current level of diversions is available for a short duration only, and is 
not sufficient to mature a full crop. Canal capacities permitting, a limited quantity (about 
2 million acre feet) can be used for relieving water stress in existing cropped areas. The 
utility of the flood water is thus very marginal unless additional storage is provided to 
lengthen the supply period. Providing more storage  in the system could increase water 
captured by 15 million acre feet (14 percent) over the current level of diversions. 
However, additional canal capacity, which could be acquired either by remodelling the 
existing  system or by building new canals, would be required to utilise these flows. 
Such investments  would be very expensive and relatively uneconomic.1 
Prospects of extending irrigation outside the Indus Basin are limited. About 2.2 
million hectares of land are located outside the Indus canal commanded area, scattered in 
relatively small parcels with  water coming from open wells, tubewells, lift pumps, 
karezes, springs, and small diversions;  water sources for perennial irrigation outside the 
Indus system are largely exhausted. Some extension in partial irrigation is feasible by 
using flood flows and water harvesting and about 16,000 hectares could be brought 
under irrigation by harnessing the hill torrents on the right bank of the Indus. These 
schemes are costly, however,  and water supplies are not reliable for high-yielding crops. 
Groundwater use, which has been major source of growth in agricultural 
production in Pakistan over the past two decades, also seems to be reaching its upper 
limit. Currently more than 300,000 private tubewells supply about 40 percent of total 
irrigation  water in Pakistan. As a result of increasing extraction from the aquifers, the 
groundwater table in most fresh groundwater areas is falling, limiting the potential for 
further groundwater development. 
 
1Water Sector Investment Planning Study (WSIP) estimates a net benefit-cost ratio of 1.6 at 12 percent 
for storages in the Indus system; the benefit-cost ratios for command area extension projects are estimated at 7.0 
for the Dajal Branch Extension, 1.0 for the Greater Thal Canal, and 0.4 for the Rainee Canal projects.  
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Water supply (and hence agricultural growth) could be expanded greatly by 
improving the efficiency of the existing system. Investments in improving efficiency, 
thus have high economic returns. Benefit-cost ratios of irrigation system rehabilitation 
and on-farm water management investments range from 2.5. to 6 at 12 percent. Major 
reforms are needed just to sustain the current system, which faces serious problems (as 
outlined in the next section). 
Institutional reform should be the main focus of development of irrigation in 
Pakistan in the future. Increasing efficiency of the irrigation system will require 
substantive improvement in water management as well as increased water supply and 
will demand better financial, managerial, and technical  planning. The performance of 
the sector will depend on redefining the roles of the public and private sectors and 
enhancing the capabilities of both sectors.     
 
MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
Rigid system design and inadequate drainage, low delivery efficiency and 
inequitable distribution of water, waterlogging and salinity, and over exploitation 
of groundwater in fresh areas represent major problems in Pakistan’s irrigation 
system. 
 
Rigid System Design 
Although the development of barrages, reservoirs, and link canals has provided 
more control over distribution, the irrigation system is operated on historic canal 
diversion patterns that in many cases no longer correspond to water requirements. 
Inefficient reservoir capacity combined with the highly seasonal pattern of river flows— 
which provide roughly 85 percent of water during the summer—result in inadequate 
water availability at the beginning and end of the summer and during the winter. This 
mismatch between water supplies and water requirements constrains agricultural 
production. 
Each watercourse is a miniature irrigation system, with channels up to 10 miles 
long. Watercourse commands range from 200 to 700 acres, with discharges of 1 to 3 
cusecs. Each command is divided into 25-acre squares, each of which has access to the 
public watercourse at a single point and includes a network of farm channels. Because 
the average farm is much smaller than 25 acres and parts of the farm are not cropped 
each season, channels can take up as much as 8 percent of the square’s area. A better-
organised square would allow for more cropping area and less water loss. Improved 
layouts of farm land with shorter and fewer farm  channels could also improve on-farm 
delivery efficiency. Redesign  of farm layout would require land consolidation or 
integration, however, which is difficult in Pakistan because of poor land records. More 
efficient designs could easily be adopted in new areas, however. 
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Inadequate Drainage 
Flat topography and lack of well-defined natural drainage in the Indus Plain 
create a surface drainage problem, which has been compounded by the construction of 
roads, railways, flood embankments, and irrigation systems that obstruct natural 
drainage flows. Since the 1960s efforts have been made to provide drainage in the 
irrigated areas and several large drainage programmes are ongoing. Out of the gross 
canal commanded area of 16.7 million hectare acres about 6.5 million hectare acres 
requires drainage, of which about 1.86 million hectare acres are covered under ongoing 
projects (Table 1).  Providing  drainage  to  such  a  vast  area is a large undertaking. An 
area of about 2.38 million hectare acres is estimated to have a water table of less than 5 
feet. The government considers such areas disaster areas gives them high priority for 




Scope of Drainage Requirements in Pakistan 





Gross Area 16.67 100 
Total Area Requiring Drainage 11.46 69 
Area under Completed Projects 5.85 35 
Area Requiring Drainage in Future 6.50 39 
Under On-going Project 1.86 11 
Remaining Area 4.64 28 
New Area 3.75 22 
Under Completed Projects Requiring Drainage 0.89 5 
Area with Water Table Less Than 5 Feet in April/June 1989-90 2.39 14 
Under On-going Projects 0.85 5 
Under Completed Projects Requiring Drainage 0.51 3 
Remaining Area 1.03 6 
 
Provision of drainage is essential for maintaining the agriculture sector resource 
base: disposal of drainage effluent in the rivers, canals, and evaporation ponds will not 
be feasible in the long run. An outlet to the sea with link drains from the rest of the basin 
will be required to carry highly saline effluent to the sea. Drainage investments are 
highly viable, with rates of return close to 20 percent.2  The absence of natural drainage 
and the continuous nature of the Indus Plain groundwater system requires that all 
drainage infrastructure be developed in an integrated manner. Independently developed 
local schemes may be in danger of being overwhelmed by neighbouring undrained areas 
with high water tables and becoming ineffective. Because of the large scope of the 
investments and cross linkages, balanced development in the drainage sector requires 
2The EER of SCARPIV was estimated to be 19 percent; the actual EER was 18 percent for SCARP 
Mardan and Left Bank Outfall Drainage. 
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integration of local area drainage needs and such infrastructural developments as outfall 
drains for the conveyance of drainage effluent from larger tracts. 
  
Low Delivery Efficiency and Inequitable Distribution 
As a result of age, overuse, and poor maintenance, canal delivery is extremely 
inefficient. Average delivery efficiency is 35–40 percent  from the canal head to the root 
zone, with most losses occurring in watercourses. The loss of such a large proportion of 
surface water reduces water available for crops and contributes  to waterlogging and 
salinity. 
In many irrigation systems with drainage, excess water and water lost in irrigation 
return to the river, to be used again downstream. The loss in efficiency to the river basin 
is thus lower than the loss to any single scheme. 
Inequitable distribution represents another serious problem. Because of poor 
efficiency water does not reach users at the tail end of the system — at least not at the 
rate intended in the system’s design. Illegal pumping from canals exacerbates the 
inequitable distribution of water. 
  
Water-logging and Salinity 
Soil salinity may be robbing Pakistan of about 25 percent of its potential 
production of major crops [World Bank (1992)]. In an environment like the Indus Basin 
(flat topography, poor natural drainage, porous soils, semi-arid climate with high 
evaporation) irrigation without adequate drainage will inevitably lead to rising water 
tables and salinity. The increase in the diversion of river flows for irrigation and seepage 
from canals, watercourses, and irrigated areas has meant a gradual rise in the 
groundwater table. By the 1960s a series of SCARPs were initiated. Despite these 
efforts, however, about 30 percent of the gross commanded area is waterlogged, of 
which about 13 percent is considered highly waterlogged. About 8 percent of the gross 
commanded area is estimated to be severely affected by salt; another 6 percent is 
believed to be moderately affected. 
 
Over-exploitation of Groundwater in Fresh Water Areas 
Groundwater use has contributed to increased agricultural production since the 
late 1970s. Groundwater tubewells not only supply additional water but provide 
flexibility to match surface water supplies with crop water requirements. The explosive 
growth in groundwater use by the private sector (6 percent annual  growth in number 2 
private tubewell) may cause saline water to contaminate freshwater aquifers by 
excessive lowering of water tables in fresh groundwater areas. Furthermore, in many 
canal commanded areas, where canal water is not sufficient because of inequitable 
distribution, farmers depend on tubewells and tend to overexploit groundwater. In the 
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absence of adequate leaching and effective  conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, 
excessive pumpage introduces salinity in the root zone. 
 
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INADEQUATE PLANNING OR 
SUPERVISION BY THE GOVERNMENT 
 
Inadequate Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
Pakistan’s irrigation and drainage system has been deteriorating because of 
deferred maintenance and utilisation beyond design capacities. Under Bank Projects 
Provinces agreed to maintain the 1988 levels of expenditure on surface irrigation and 
subsurface saline drainage facilities in real terms. Actual expenditure fell far short of 
1988 levels in all provinces except the North West Frontier Province (NWFP): overall 
the gap is more than 24 percent, with gaps as high as 37 percent in some regions (Sindh). 
Privatisation of groundwater tubewells has proceeded more slowly than planned and in 
Punjab and Sindh, where most of these tubewells are located, O&M requirements are 
twice as high as estimated. Had O&M requirements of publicly owned tubewells been 
included the financing gap would thus have been even larger. 
  
Inadequate Cost Recovery of O&M Expenditure 
In the past capital costs of irrigation development were recovered from users. In 
recent years,  however, water and drainage charges have been intended to cover only 
O&M. The figures are available only upto 1992-93 and these figures shows that the gap 
between O&M expenditure and recoveries through water charges has been increasing, 
reaching 44.4 percent in 1992. In Punjab and Sindh the gap is about 30 percent, and 
would have risen to more than 60 percent  if expenditures on public tubewells had been 
included; relative to recoveries, the overall  gap would have been 57 percent. In NWFP 
and Balochistan the gap is as high as 80 percent. 
Inadequate O&M is largely the result of inadequate institutional capability and 
lack of funding. Operating under a structure and set of rules formulated more than 100 
years ago, Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs), resist any form of institutional 
change, modern technology, or management practice. Emphasis on technical 
performance is declining, along  with the PIDs’ability to enforce statuary provisions of 
the Canal and Drainage Act, the foundation of good irrigation practice. 
Funds allocated to PIDs by provincial governments are insufficient for proper 
O&M. The shortfall stems from low water rates and inadequate assessment and 
collection of charges. Water  charges in Pakistan apply only to surface water supply and 
are imposed on a crop acreage basis that varies with the type of crop grown. Rates are 
currently set significantly below the level needed to recover O&M expenditures. 
Revenue collection and implementation of O&M are undertaken buy different agencies 
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and revenue does not go directly to the PIDs, thus eliminating incentives to improve 
water delivery and the collection of charges. 
The Price of irrigated water grossly understates the true value of water to 
agricultural producers. Based on actual prices paid by farmers in private sales the value 
of water to users is as much as ten times higher than current official charges. The 
difference between the cost and the value of water represents a hidden gain, or rent , to 
water users and distorts the use of the system,  causing a breakdown in system discipline 
and unequal distribution as users struggle to capture this rent (through illegal pumping or 
breaking the mogha or the warabandi). 
Farmers willingly make informal payments to irrigation system officials to obtain 
additional water. Yet they are unwilling to pay even the current low O&M charges 
because they are seen as unrelated to any water deliveries or O&M services they may 
receive from the PIDs. At the same time, PID budgets are unrelated to water charges, 
making them independent of (and indifferent to) user requirements (although they may 
be responsive to individual users as part of rent-seeking). 
 
Poor Investment Planning 
Investment planning for irrigation and drainage is conducted at three levels in 
Pakistan. Sectoral plans establish a medium- to long-term framework for sectoral 
development, five-year plans are used for short-term planning, and yearly allocations are 
made by the Annual Development Programme (ADP). In the past much effort has gone 
into sectoral planning. Plans such as the Revised Action Programme (RAP) and Water 
Sector Investment Planning Study (WSIPS), prepared with foreign assistance, take a 
comprehensive look at sectoral requirements and objectives. These plans are rarely 
incorporated wholly into either five-year plans or the ADP, however, and institutional 
and policy recommendations are often ignored. Instead, the tendency is to invest in 
poorly planned civil works packages. 
 
Inadequate Project Preparation and 
Lack of Project Ranking 
No identifiable rational process for identifying and prioritising investments in 
irrigation and drainage exists in Pakistan. Project approval follows guidelines issued by 
the Planning Commission in the 1960s and feasibility reports contain insufficient 
information on which to implement projects successfully. Moreover, provincial and 
federal agencies are unable to prepare projects effectively: projects prepared by the 
government often use cost estimates that are distorted by out-of-date rate schedules and 
designs that use obsolete techniques and guidelines, and interproject and intersectoral 
linkages are generally not considered. 
Because of the inability of the government to prepare projects feasibility plans for 
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externally assisted projects are usually prepared by consulting firms, which help the 
agencies in planning and development. Few domestic consulting firms are qualified to 
undertake these assignments, however, and ambiguous regulations, unfair hiring 
practices, and the complexity of hiring consultants limits their use. 
Project approval is slow and often based on affordability and social benefits 
rather than on economic criteria. Projects are approved as they are proposed, thus 
facilitating the politicisation of the process. Moreover, even if a project is economically 
viable it is unlikely to be approved if it is not included in the current five-year plan. 
Finally, no process exists for evaluating and ranking potential projects. 
These shortcomings were among the major constraints affecting performance 
during the Seventh Five-Year Plan and the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992). By and large 
each project is revised time and again in terms of cost, schedule, and benefits, disturbing 
the investment plan and adversely affecting policies and targets. The need for proper 
planning, project preparation, cost estimation, and monitoring during implementation for 
each water development and drainage project is critical. Continuous monitoring and 
periodic reviews are necessary for corrective action to complete the project within the 
envisaged time and cost. 
 
Declining Investment Financing and  
Inadequate Capital Cost Recovery 
Pakistan’s irrigation and drainage system has been almost entirely funded by the 
public sector. Given the political climate and the state of the banking system in Pakistan 
the costs of establishing the infrastructure to achieve economies of scale could not have 
been met by the private sector. Subsequent tubewell irrigation investment did involve 
substantial private sector investment, and indication of the ability and willingness of the 
private sector to finance further development. 
Since the mid-1980s public spending on irrigation has been declining by about 4 
percent a year in real terms. Completion of projects underway has been delayed and 
there has been a tendency to start new projects without ensuring the availability of funds, 
further delaying completion. Funds available for project implementation have been 
severely reduced because of the high rate of interest charged to the project during 
construction because of the prolonged implementation period. One major reason for the 
shortage of development funds is the failure to recover capital costs from users. In the 
past some capital costs were recovered under provisions of the Canal and Drainage Act. 
Land previously classified as waste (uncultivated) was sold to farmers upon irrigation 
development. Privately owned land that was farmed was also subject to “betterment 
charges” following irrigation from a public system (USAID 1984). Water charges, too, 
included a component for capital cost recovery. In 1972-73 and 1973-74 revenue 
receipts were higher than the total O&M expenditure by 13 and 25 percent. Revenue 
Future of Irrigation and Drainage 573 
receipts fell below the O&M expenditure for the first time in 1974-75 and capital cost 
recovery has lapsed since then, with water charges set with the aim of recovering O&M 
costs only. (The single exception is the On-Farm Water Management programme, in 
which about 30 percent of the cost of some materials is recovered.) 
 
THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM:WATER AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
Waterlogging and salinity, overexploitation of fresh groundwater, low efficiency 
in delivery and use, inequitable distribution, unreliable delivery, and insufficient cost 
recovery are not the causes of Pakistan’s inadequate irrigation system but  symptoms of 
a deeper problem—the treatment of irrigation water as a public good. In fact, water is a 
private tradable good, for which markets can operate (as they currently do informally). 
Lack of well-defined individual property rights and the banning of the sale of surface 
water severely constrain  informal irrigation water markets. 
Rather than addressing the roots of the deficiencies of the system the government 
has continued to treat water as a public good, causing inefficient pricing of water, 
misallocation of resources, and widespread rent-seeking behaviour. The problems of the 
system have been compounded by inadequate public sector investment in drainage, 
unsatisfactory management of public expenditure, and deteriorating institutional 
capability. Without the introduction of the right incentives, economic efficiency in the 
delivery of water cannot be achieved and the system cannot be sustained financially. 
 
Efficient Pricing of Water 
Creating water user rights and legalising water trading can be expected to provide 
a transparent market value for water and its opportunity cost, promoting more efficient 
use of the resource through equalisation of the  marginal value product of water in its 
alternative uses. In the long run, efficient allocation of water is achieved  when the 
marginal value product of water is equal to the marginal cost of supplying it. If demand 
for water cannot be satisfied in the short run by charging marginal delivery cost a 
capacity constraint  exists and an optimal allocation is achieved when the marginal value 
product of water in one use reflects the (opportunity) cost of foregoing its use in the best 
alternative activity—that is, when marginal  value products are equalised.3  In an ideal 
irrigation system, in which the water utility has the flexibility to supply water in response 
to user demand, the market price for water will distribute the resource optimally, since 
irrigators will bid up the price of water until marginal returns are equalised. If the price 
does not reflect opportunity costs, overconsumption and wastage occur. 
Because the Indus Basin system operates at its capacity limit the opportunity cost 
of one unit  of water (its marginal value product in agricultural use) overestimates the 
3An equalisation of marginal value products assumes that delivery costs are equal. If substantial 
divergences in transportation costs exist, net rents are equalised (marginal value product minus marginal cost of 
obtaining it). 
Rashid Faruqee 574 
short-run marginal cost of running the system. The system was designed to deliver water 
in proportion to landholdings. If all farms had the  same agricultural production function 
and were equipped with the same inputs of other factors (such as labour, fertiliser, and 
tractors) such a system would result in efficient use of the limited resource [Rhodes and 
Sampath (1988)]. In fact, there is substantial variation in water efficiency across regions 
and across crops that cannot be explained by diverging transportation and delivery costs. 
 The average financial return to water is Rs 700 per acre foot, but ranges from Rs 0 to Rs 
2,000, suggesting significant variations in marginal returns to water.  Since water, not 
land, is the constraining factor in agricultural production, the average and the marginal 
productivity of water  can be expected to move together. Prices in informal local water 
markets reveal huge variations.  
Privately pumped tubewell water prices range from Rs 100 to Rs 400 per acre 
foot; informal water sales that take place along a watercourse range from Rs 100 to Rs 
700 per acre foot. External impacts occurring after the cropping decision make 
equalisations of the marginal returns to water impossible. But the large divergence in 
returns and prices signals high potential output gains  that could materialise if available 
water were allocated more efficiently. 
Data constraints make it difficult to determine actual long-run marginal costs for 
individual users and to disaggregate the individual categories of marginal costs. Practical 
billing necessities often render detailed long-run marginal cost pricing uneconomical. 
For political reasons unified regional or provincial rates might have to be adopted. 
Irrigation agencies often supply water to remote areas, where marginal costs outweight 
opportunity costs. In such cases the government could pay the agency the difference 
between the delivery cost and the O&M charge prior to actual delivery (that is, the cost 
of implementing the social programme). Such programmes divert the agency from its 
basic objective of cost-effective delivery of irrigation water, however, and cause a 
breakdown in user discipline as more and more users seek preferential treatment, 
expanding the beneficiary group until the programme become a severe financial burden 
to the public sector. 
Unlike on-farm drainage, off-farm drainage is a public good, because it is not 
possible to exclude individuals from the area-wide drainage benefit of lowering the 
water table. Thus, off-farm drainage should continue to be provided by the government. 
The underlying problem of inappropriate institutional framework will require reforms 
that will ensure autonomy, transparency, and accountability within the current 
institutional set-up. 
 
Sustainable Cost Recovery 
Replacement of PIDs with public utilities, coupled with development of water 
markets based on water property rights, facilitates both efficient water pricing and 
sustainable cost recovery. Cost recovery should reflect the full O&M charges of 
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delivering  a unit  of water, including the costs of the provincial and federal water 
authorities; it should not cover past capital expenditures. All  future investment costs, 
however—for additional and replacement  capture, storage, and delivery — should be 
fully recovered, through delivery charges, the sale of rights, or both. Long-term 
development planning must take these charges into account in estimating future demand 
for irrigation and these costs must be made explicit by utilities in delivery contracts with 
user organisations. 
Delivery charges that cover the full cost of O&M costs would not be burdensome 
for users. Current O&M charges represent only 5 percent of either costs of production or 
farm income and cover 70 percent of total O&M charges. Full recovery of current O&M 
charges would require that the rate charged be doubled. With no increase in delivery 
efficiencies, the increased charge amounts to Rs 40 per acre foot at the mogha and Rs 70 
per acre foot in the field—still much lower (but higher than the lower end of informal 
market price) than the financial marginal value of water of Rs 700 per acre foot, the 
informal market value of Rs 100 — Rs 700 per acre-foot, or private tubewell water 
prices of Rs 100–Rs 400 per acre foot. To the extend that farmer organisations take over 
O&M at the distributary level and improve delivery efficiency these charges would be 
reduced. Significant efficiency gains below the mogha could also be made through 
farmer organisations. 
Pricing of delivery services by public utilities must be regulated to prevent 
market imperfections leading to discriminatory pricing practices and 
misstatements of costs in establishing the basis for cost recovery. A commonly 
used yardstick of financial viability is the potential to earn an acceptable return on 
assets (such as net operating income) as a fraction of net fixed assets plus working 
capital [Munasinge (1988)]. An upper limit to returns imposes a restriction on 
average water charges. Regulated in this way the system would give priority to 
achieving the financial objective of self-sustainability. Possibilities of following 
more closely the long-run marginal cost pricing approach (that is, charging  
different blocks of buyers a fixed connection charge and attempting  to price the 
unit of water at its marginal cost while taking into account possible future 
investment projects) could also be explored. 
Regulation to ensure adequate investment in system expansion appears 
unnecessary. Although the presence of a monopolist utility might appear to imply 
underinvestment in the water supply, competition from basic water rights holders 
(totalling about 75 percent of captured water), groundwater, and other utilities would 
ensure that appropriate investment was made in the long run. In development of new 
storage the utility would face competition from federal and provincial governments, 
other public utilities, and the larger, more advanced farmer organisations. The monopoly 
of the public utility thus extends only to the delivery of diverted water and regulation 
should be confined solely to this area. 
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A NEW APPROACH TO ADMINISTERING THE SYSTEM 
The future strategy for irrigation and drainage will require a major change in the 
public sector’s approach. The goals of establishing an efficient self-sustaining irrigation 
and drainage system can be achieved only by promoting the use of market-determined 
incentives for improving the management of the irrigation and drainage services and 
giving the private sector a greater  stake in the system. The process could begin by 
decentralising the management of irrigation and drainage systems by developing 
commercially oriented public utilities on a canal command basis, developing suitable 
farmer organisations around distributaries/minors, formalising water rights, developing 
autonomous provincial water authorities, and developing provincial regulatory bodies 
for regulating public utilities, water rights, and groundwater resources. The structure 
proposed here approximates the current provincial structure in order to minimise 
disruption. The functions of the PID would be divided horizontally between the public 
utilities and a provincial water authority. A provincial regulatory authority would be 
required for the utilities and user organisations. The role of the  federal authorities would 
remain unchanged. 
Public utilities at the canal command level—which are large enough to capture 
any scale economies in administration yet small enough to be responsive to users—
would play the leading  role in the management of the system until user groups matured 
and were able to take over. Farmer organisations would have to be fostered to provide 
structure on the demand side. Such organisations would make a unique contribution to 
the welfare of farmers and to the development of Pakistan’s irrigation and drainage by 
providing a counterbalance to the monopoly of the public utilities, by facilitating water 
market development, and by reducing administrative and O&M costs. 
 
Institutional Structure 
The proposed institutional structure provides a greater role for the private sector 
and autonomy for public sector agencies. Federal institutions would continue to be 
responsible for overall assessment, coordination, and development of interprovincial 
water resources and works. An administratively autonomous provincial water authority 
would be responsible for coordinating all planning and development of water resources 
within the province and would handle distribution of irrigation water to financially 
autonomous independent public utilities at the canal command level. At the production 
face a farmer organisation would distribute water among its members. A provincial 
regulatory commission would regulate the O&M charges of the public utilities and 
adjudicate farmers’ disputes. 
 
Federal Government and Agencies 
The role of the federal institutions would change only slightly. Development 
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of appropriate legislation to establish water rights, develop water markets, and 
regulate public utilities would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Water and 
Power. WAPDA and the Chief Engineering Advisor would continue to work as 
executive arms of the Ministry of Water and Power and would assume responsibility 
for the following functions: 
 • Assessing and allocating water resources among sectors in the light of demand 
patterns and efficiency in use. 
 • Making hydrological measurements; investigating, planning, and monitoring 
water above the rim stations; and managing watersheds.               
 • Monitoring and controlling groundwater aquifers. 
 • Developing and implementing criteria and programmes for monitoring and 
enforcing standards for water quality in rivers and groundwater aquifers. 
 • Assessing and forecasting water availability and preparing basin-wide 
operational plans in coordination with the provincial water authorities and 
public utilities. 
 • Delivering water to the provincial water authorities. 
 • Coordinating flood control works and flood management. 
 • Planning, developing, and operating and maintaining large dams, 
interprovincial link canals, and outfall drains (in response to long-term needs 
identified by the provincial water authorities and/or public utilities with full 
cost recovery for such services.  
 • Recovering O&M  and capital costs of federal infrastructure through water 
charges, sales of water, or revenue installments. 
Indus River System Authority 
The Indus River System Authority (IRSA) was created in 1992 to oversee the 
implementation of the Provincial Water Accord by the provinces. Its role would not 
change under the new set-up. IRSA would lay down the basis for regulation and 
distribution of surface water among provinces according to the allocation policies 
agreed to in the Provincial Water Accord, review the reservoir operation, settle any 
disputes between provinces relating to distribution of river and reservoir waters, and 
evaluate the availability of water for all new projects. 
 
Provincial Water Authority 
An administratively autonomous Provincial Water Authority (akin to the federal 
WAPDA) would be responsible for delivering water to public utilities. These deliveries 
might consist of the basic water rights of public utilities and water captured by the 
provincial water authority, or water traded among different public utilities.  
Rashid Faruqee 578 
Total water use in each province would be determined according to shares allocated 
under the Provincial Water Accord. The provincial water authority would recover 
O&M costs for the delivery of the basic rights volume; any incremental water 
captured by the Provincial Water Authority would be auctioned off. 
The Provincial Water Authority would be responsible for the O&M of link 
canals, barrages, and other provincial facilities distributing water to public utilities 
(although implementation could be contracted out) and would plan and develop new 
facilities on behalf of public utilities to improve water delivery efficiency, regulate 
water within the province, and facilitate sales among public utilities. The cost of 
these activities would be recovered through the sale of water or revenue installments. 
Transaction fees would be charged to recover costs involved in facilitating trading 
among public utilities. The Provincial Water Authority would also be responsible for 
developing, operating, and maintaining main and/or tributary drains; receiving 
drainage effluent from the farmer organisations within the province; and handling 
flood control and protection works and flood management within the province. 
 
Provincial Regulatory Commission 
A Provincial Regulatory Commission would oversee the financial affairs of 
public utilities, register water rights, and adjudicate local water distribution 
disputes. The commission would comprise two wings. The regulatory wing would 
oversee the financial aspects of public utilities operations, including reviewing 
and registering allocation of basic water rights and regulating public utility 
charges for delivery of basic water rights volumes. All water distribution disputes, 
including disputes among the members of a farmer organisation, would be 
adjudicated by the arbitration wing. 
 
Public Utilities 
Public utilities are a key interim element in the proposed institutional structure. 
The public utility would need to be a self-sustaining autonomous body with a hard 
budget constraint. Services would be provided on a commercial basis. The public utility 
would comprise two wings, operations and technical assistance. Although a public utility 
could cover several canal commands it would be desirable for accurate  water 
accounting for a canal command not to be split among more than one public utility. The 
main function of the operational wing of the public utility would be to take delivery of 
water from the provincial  water authority and to allocate it among farmer organisations. 
Where contracted to do so by the provincial water authority, it would undertake 
development, O&M, and collection of charges for drainage and flood protection systems 
within its command area or elsewhere. The technical assistance wing would be 
responsible for helping farmers develop farmer organisations and making decisions 
about technical options. To do so the public utility could hire services of consulting 
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firms, NGOs, or other agencies with expertise needed by the farmer organisations. As 
the farmer organisations matured the activities of the technical assistance wing would be 
scaled down. Revenue of the public utility would come from recovery of O&M cost 
(including O&M costs charged by WAPDA) and the Provincial Water Authority for 
delivering water established as farmer organisation’s basic right, sale of nonbasic rights 
water to farmer organisations or other public utilities, and transaction fees for facilitating 
 water trade between different farmer organisation). The public utility would not get 
involved in disputes among members of the farmer organisation as long as the farmer 
organisation paid its water charges. If the farmer organisation did not pay its water 
charges the public utility would be empowered to stop supplying water. 
The major functions of the public utility would include the following: 
 • Operating and maintaining irrigation and drainage facilities in its command 
area. 
 • Collecting water delivery charges from the farmer organisations and collecting 
drainage service charges as contracted for by the provincial water authority and 
federal agencies. (Drainage costs should also be shared by the industries that 
dispose their effluent into the drainage system. The cost of flood protection and 
management should be also shared by all beneficiaries.) 
 • Passing on the provincial and federal share of fees collected to the provincial 
water authority and federal agencies. 
 • In  coordination with the farmer organisation, determining the delivery point at 
which the farmer organisation would receive water from the public utility. 
During transition, the delivery point may be at the head of a watercourse. As 
the farmer organisations mature and expand their management capabilities, the 
delivery point should move higher up the system. The system should have 
built-in incentives for encouraging greater participation of the farmer 
organisations in the distribution of water.    
 • In coordination with the farmer organisation, determining basic water rights at 
the delivery point  based on the following criteria: 
 – The volume of water based on the approved water allowance at the water 
course head and the designed capacity factor for the distributary would form 
the lower bound  for the water right.4  
 – The volume estimated, based on an average capacity factor during the post-
Tarbela period, would form the upper bound.   
 – In  determining  actual water rights consideration would be given to soil and 
4At the design stage it is assumed that when operational the distributary will run full—that is, all 
watercourses on the distributary will draw their authorised water allowances. The capacity factor determines the 
number of days the distributary will run. The guidelines require that a distributary  be operated for a block of 
time at least 8 days to ensure that all users on a watercourse receive their share and losses are minimised. 
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groundwater conditions, delivery losses within the  farmer organisation area, 
land distribution/farm size within the farmer organisation, and the location of 
the delivery point. 
 – Specific water rights would be negotiated between farmer organisations and 
public utilities, and approved and registered by the Provincial Regulatory 
Commission. 
 – Groundwater rights would be allocated following allocation of surface water 
property rights. 
 – Water would be procured from the  provincial water authority as available 
(in addition to the basic water rights) for sale to farmer organisations. Excess 
water would be sold to other public utilities and trading between farmer 
organisations would be facilitated  (for  which the public utilities may charge 
a transaction fee). 
 – Field drains in the farmer organisation’s areas and drains connecting the 
areas to the provincial drainage system would  be developed and maintained 
as contracted for by the provincial water authority or the farmer 
organisations. 
 – Commercial investments in system development would be initiated to 
increase water use efficiency, and  fee-based technical assistance would be 
provided to farmer organisations on O&M of irrigation and drainage 
systems. 
 
Drainage and Flood Protection 
Because drainage is a public good the primary responsibility for provision and 
O&M of drainage and flood protection services rests with the public sector, at both the 
federal and provincial level. The delivery agency (the public utility) has the opportunity 
to play a unique role, but steps will have to be taken to avoid unnecessary monopolies. 
A three-tier drainage system is proposed. Responsibility for interprovincial drains 
and flood protection would remain with the federal authorities. The Provincial Water 
Authority would be responsible for development and O&M of provincial drainage and 
flood protection. As monopoly suppliers of canal water public utilities have a unique 
ability to collect drainage cost recovery charges on behalf of the provincial water 
authority together with irrigation water charges. The provincial water authority could 
also contract with public utilities to carry out drainage O&M within their own CCA. To 
preserve competition, however, all provincial water authority contracts for drainage 
construction, contract management, and O&M should be awarded through competitive 
bidding. Farmer organisations may develop local area drainage schemes through 
contracts with public utilities or private contractors. Farmer and other user organisations 
may internalise collection of drainage charges or use the utilities’ collection facilities. 
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An optional two-tiered system would charge the public utilities with 
responsibility for providing all off-farm drainage needs and recovering costs, which 
could be tied to irrigation water charges. Such charges would come under the regulatory 
oversight of the Provincial Regulatory Commission. The Provincial  Water Authority 
would likely remain responsible for overall planning and coordination of provincial 
drainage development in addition to its other responsibilities. 
 
Farmer Organisations 
If Pakistan’s farmers have managed their own watercourses for decades without 
formally organising why should they do so now? Pakistan’s irrigation system was built 
to serve fewer farmers holding larger acreage than they do today. Migration and land 
fragmentation have put great pressure on already scarce water resources [Government of 
Pakistan (1988)]. In the process discipline has broken down, theft has become 
increasingly common, and inequity has grown [Bandaragoda and Firdousi (1992)]. Real 
O&M expenditures have fallen markedly over the past few decades so that less water 
now reaches the mogha. Flows through watercourses are subject to leakage and theft, 
and water reaching the tail (when it does so at all) is inadequate. Given the government’s 
fiscal constraints an alternative O&M financing strategy must be pursued. The preferred 
course is to transfer greater control of the irrigation system to organisations of water 
users. Because traditional methods of decision-making among irrigators have not proved 
to be sufficient to shoulder these new responsibilities, cooperation among users (not just 
within but among farmer organisations) will be required to transfer greater O&M control 
from the government and to enable water markets to function effectively. 
To realise the full potential of water markets maximum flexibility and control 
must be afforded to the buyers and sellers of water. Farmers could arrange the sale of 
water among individual users located at the lower end of the system, something that 
would be prohibitively expensive for a public agency to do. Formation of farmer 
organisations, initially at the distributary/minor level, would reduce the O&M burden of 
the public sector, enhance farmer participation in the distribution of water, and provide a 
market in which the true value of water would be transparent. The farmer organisations 
would likely be cooperatives and thus subject to oversight and regulation by provincial 
government agencies responsible for cooperatives. In most provinces specialised 
enabling legislation would be required before such organisations could be established. 
Ensuring accountability of monopolies (public or private) is crucial and is best 
achieved through a combination of regulation (service standards, reporting requirements, 
and so forth) and consumer rights. Consumers—acting collectively and individually to 
protect their rights, and reinforced by legislation—help ensure accountability. Farmer 
organisations must play a central role in ensuring that public utilities are accountable for 
service delivery, maintenance of physical structures, and assessment of charges. 
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Farmer organisations must also help bring user discipline to water distribution. 
The fact that warabandi on a watercourse, which is implemented by the farmers 
themselves, is rarely violated shows that the farmer organisations can improve operation 
of the system. Their role should thus be expanded to the highest possible level in the 
system—at least to the distributaries and minors. 
In the short term, the main functions of a farmer organisation should include the 
following: 
 • Determining a suitable delivery point from which  to receive supplies from the  
public utility, assess basic water rights, and determine the share of each farmer 
organisation member. 
 • Distributing water and facilitating trade of water among members. 
 • Estimating and forecasting water needs for the farmer organisation area and 
negotiating with the public utility to acquire incremental water or arrange sale 
of excess water to another farmer organisation or public utility. 
 • Carrying out O&M of both the irrigation and the drainage systems within the 
farmer organisation area. 
 • Planning and developing the irrigation  and drainage system within the farmer 
organisation area by improving the  distributary/minor, setting up control 
structures to make the system flexible for trading among farmer organisation 
members, installing meter flumes or other suitable water measuring devices for 
water accounting, redesigning watercourses and their layout, and/or laying out 
farm land, on-farm drainage, and connections to the public utilities drainage 
system. 
 • Developing groundwater  to meet water needs. 
 • Estimating total O&M cost, including public utility charges, collection of water 
charges or other fees from its members, and payments to the public utility. 
In the long term farmer organisations would play a larger role. Development of 
farmer organisations in Pakistan is currently inadequate to support operation of more 
than a watercourse; even at this level, despite  substantial effort by the World Bank, 
results have fallen short of expectations. Because of the underdevelopment  of farmer 
organisations, public utilities will have to play the leading role in the short run. The 
interim role of the public utilities should not impede eventual takeover by the farmer 
organisations and other local groups with valid interests in area water resource 
management. As the farmer organisations expand from the watercourse level, through 
amalgamation at the distributary and minor levels and through a federation to the entire 
canal command, they are expected to become more involved in the work of the public 
utility through greater representation on its board. Eventually, formation of long-run  
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business policy should  be well within the capabilities of the farmer organisation and the 
farmer organisation federation would be expected to try to rationalise other productivity-
related agricultural matters, such as land consolidation and technology transfer. 
 
Transition Arrangements 
The total period required for transition depends on the acceptance of the new 
institutional structure and the speed with which farmer organisations are developed. 
Total transition is expected to take about fifteen years, with completion of all four phases 
expected within twenty years. The structure outlined here will require adjustments to suit 
the specific conditions at the different canal command areas. A phased approach is 
therefore desirable, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Phasing in the Restructuring of the Irrigation and Drainage System 
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Table 2—(Continued) 
























































Farmer organisations are 
formed, water rights of the 
farmer organisations are 
determined jointly by the 
farmer organisation and public 
utility, and approved and 
registered by the Provincial 
Regulatory Commission. To 
expedite formation of farmer 
organisations incentive 
packages and technical 
assistance will be offered to 
potential farmer organisations. 
 
In the farmer organisation 
areas, the system is remodelled 
wherever necessary  and water 
is delivered to the farmer 
organisations on volumetric 
basis at the delivery point. 
Total deliveries will consist of 
water rights and purchases 
from public utility or other 
farmer organisations. 
 
In non-farmer organisation 
areas the public utility will 
revise the warabandi if a 
dispute arises. 
 
Technical wing of public 
utility provides assistance in 
installation of control 
structures and measuring 
devices within its area. 
 
Public utility improves 
delivery efficiency and 
expands the water supply. 
Drainage needs are assessed 
and drainage network 
developed if farmer 
organisations agree. 
 
Rest of the canal commands 
are converted to public utilities 
and PWAs are formed. 
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O&M of the system 
below the delivery 
point, public utility 
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farmer organisation 
areas farmers are 
responsible for 
O&M below mogha 
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Phase I: Formation of Institutions 
The first step is to develop legislation and issue administrative orders and 
notifications allowing formation of public utilities, farmer organisations, water property 
rights, and water markets. The next step is to define the structure of a public utility and the 
provincial regulation commission. Because the new institutional structure may be readily 
introduced through a series of development projects it is very important to establish a link 
between it and the Annual Development Programme. The transition will start by selecting 
one of forty-three canal commands of IBIS as a pilot project under the annual development 
programme. Proposed allocations in the Eighth Five-Year Plan for the Irrigation System 
Rehabilitation Programme, On-farm Water Management Programme, and drainage can be 
used to establish the new institutional structure in the selected area. 
After the public utility is established control of irrigation and drainage in the project 
area would be transferred to the public utility. During transition the old and new systems 
would run in parallel, with built-in incentives to move toward the new system. Selection of 
the project and formation of the public utility would be announced to the farmers, who 
would be encouraged to form farmer organisations. In the beginning considerable 
assistance would be required to help farmers form farmer organisations and to prepare them 
for taking over responsibilities. These services could be provided through consulting firms 
or NGOs; the technical assistance wing of the public utility could assist in arranging such 
services. In areas in which the farmer organisations are ready for handling bulk water 
deliveries from the public utility on a volumetric basis, deliveries would be switched over 
the new system. In the rest of the area the current system would continue with revised crop-
based charges to recover full O&M costs. 
The public utility would prepare a water budget and distribution schedule for the 
command. It would define new rules of warabandi, which would include watercourse 
losses in determining time allocation for each farmer. Farmers on a water course could 
continue with the kacha warabandi (mutually agreed rotational schedule for irrigation 
deliveries on a watercourse). However, if a dispute arose the public utility would intervene 
in that watercourse command and fix new pakka warabandi (a fixed rotational schedule of 
irrigation deliveries), which would account for losses in the watercourses. The public utility 
would not be responsible for enforcing the warabandi. If a dispute arose the arbitration 
wing of the provincial regulation commission would adjudicate and its decision would be 
final. Users who did not pay water charges would be excluded from the warabandi; if 
nonpayment continued outlets would be closed.  
The public utility would estimate O&M costs and establish water charges using the 
current system (by crop) and these charges would be approved by the regulatory 
commission. If the government wished to phase increases in the public utility’s water 
charges the difference would have to be met by the government. To recover O&M cost 
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from a farmer organisation area the public utility would determine the O&M cost of 
delivering water at different points in the system and develop a volume-based rate structure, 
which would be approved by the provincial regulatory commission. 
After a farmer organisation is formed the public utility would work with it to 
determine an appropriate delivery point. This point should have a control structure for 
regulating and measuring flows. If such a structure does not exist the public utility would 
provide it. Based on the approved guidelines by the provincial regulatory commission, 
the public utility and farmer organisation would estimate basic water rights at the 
delivery point. The volume, timing, and O&M cost of delivering these basic water rights 
would then be approved by the provincial regulatory commission. 
 
Phase II: Institution Building 
As the farmer organisations are formed and the water balance in the command 
area may changes the public utility would update its water budget. In addition, the public 
utility would assess water losses in the channels under its control and develop plans to 
recover those losses. Improvement plans would be examined by the provincial 
regulatory commission (especially in the FGW areas) to determine the extent of the 
incremental water. The provincial regulatory commission could use the technical 
services of agencies such as WAPDA for this purpose. Improvements would also be 
needed to develop operational flexibility and to provide water accounting necessary for 
efficient operation of the system. At the pilot stage the public utility would require expert 
technical assistance to design replicable models. As the system developed, the public 
utility could sell any excess water to farmer organisations or to other public utilities; to 
meet the demands of farmer organisations public utilities could purchase water from 
other public utilities or the provincial water authority (when they are formed at a later 
stage). 
Different development alternatives for the pilot should be evaluated and designed 
as part of the project preparation and the public utility should be assisted in designing 
suitable controls to make the system flexible.  The complexity of the problem and the 
importance of arriving at the best solution make development of the pilot critical. A 
water measuring and accounting system for the project area should also be designed and 
consultants should assist in preliminary designs for notifying the distributaries and 
minors that are transferred to farmer organisations. These designs should be finalised 
and implemented in consultation with the farmer organisations. Drainage needs for the 
area should also be assessed and an overall plan prepared. 
The technical assistance wing of the public utility should be assigned to work 
with farmers on a distributary/minor to explain the new system and to assist them in 
forming farmer organisations. Farmers world elect representatives, register the farmer 
organisation, and establish an office and a bank account. With assistance from public 
utilities, technical assistance teams, and project consultants the farmer organisation 
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would assess the suitability of existing structures and identify the structural 
improvements (such as watercourse improvement, control structures, canal 
improvement, and measuring devices required to distribute water efficiently. Assisted by 
consultants, the farmer organisation would prepare plans for the development and 
financing of these improvements. 
In areas without farmer organisations the current system of distribution of water 
would continue, except in these areas that would receive water from the public utility 
rather than the PIDs. Water rates would be revised to recover total O&M costs. In the 
event of a water distribution conflict a revised warabandi (that would include delivery 
losses) would be implemented. 
During transition incentive packages would be offered to encourage farmer 
participation and speed the development of the public utility. Costs of such assistance 
would be fully recovered after a grace period. For the public utility technical assistance 
would be needed in the form of consulting services, establishment of offices, and 
improving structures. For farmer organisations the incentive package may consist of 
technical assistance and office establishment to be provided from the development 
budget. On-farm improvements (such as lining the watercourses, providing flow control 
and measuring devices, and improving on-farm drainage) could also be financed from 
the development budget. These would, however, be fully recovered in the form of cash 
advances, labour contribution, water charges, and /or revenue installments. The farmer 
organisations would also contribute toward improvements above the mogha. The 
recovery level from farmer organisations would be determined on the basis of types of 
improvements provided, reduction in the O&M cost of the public utility as a result of 
transfer of these facilities, and the paying capacity of the farmer organisations.   
 
Phase III: Development and Expansion 
Development and expansion (Phase III) would proceed simultaneously with 
Phase II. The public utility would improve delivery efficiency and expand the water 
supply by reducing excessive losses, remodelling the delivery system, and developing 
storage and groundwater. If most of the farmer organisations agreed, the public utility 
would plan and develop the drainage system and arrange for the disposal of drainage 
effluent. 
 
Phase IV: Expansion of the Pilot Project 
The final phase of the restructuring would involve development of public utilities 
in the remainder of the canal commands. Lessons learned from the pilot project would 
be incorporated during the transition of the rest of the area to the new structure. The 
provincial  water authority would be formed after several public utilities began 
functioning. 
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Bottom-up Versus Top-down Approach to Restructuring 
The current institutions could be transformed into the proposed structure in two 
ways. A bottom-up approach would establish a series of pilots projects (at the canal 
command level) in which public utilities and farmer organisations would take over 
O&M functions of the irrigation and drainage system.  Changes at the provincial level 
would be made after the new institutional structure began functioning satisfactorily in a 
few canal commands. 
A top-down approach would establish the provincial institutions (the provincial 
water authority and the provincial regulatory commission) first and only then set up the 
public utilities and farmer organisations at the canal command level. This approach 
might bring some efficiency at the top and could speed up transition. The first option is 
superior, however, because it minimises overall disruption by limiting its scope to pilot 
areas, leaving the rest of the system to function as it currently does; allows the system 
turnover methodology to be improved upon as the transition proceeds (this experience 
will also be useful in designing the top-level institutions); and allows the time required to 
reorient and train institutions do not become bloated replicas of the old ones.  
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